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NOTES
BATSON v. KENTUCKY: A HALF STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION (RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES UNDER THE
HEAVIER CONFINES OF EQUAL
PROTECTION)
The jury system has long been recognized as an essential fea-
ture of criminal trials.1 The sixth amendment guarantees the feder-
ally accused an "impartial jury"2 and the fourteenth amendment
extends this guarantee to state criminal defendants.3 Jury selection
techniques, as described by Lord Coke, seek to produce jurors who
are "indifferent as they stand unsworn. '4
Unfortunately, couched within the traditions of these selection
techniques lie intractable patterns of invidious discrimination. Spe-
cifically, the peremptory challenge to potential jurors is "probably
the single most significant means by which .. .prejudice and bias
[are] injected into the jury selection system." 5 This Note discusses
the concern surrounding the peremptory challenge, along with the
adequacy of the Supreme Court's latest word on the subject, Batson
v. Kentucky. 6 After explaining the basics of jury selection, this Note
briefly presents the judicial history culminating in the Batson deci-
sion. The focus then turns to the significant and inherent shortcom-
ings of Batson's remedy for discrimination. Finally, this Note
proposes changes in the jury selection system which would make the
constitutional safeguards of potential minority jurors and minority
defendants (whether based on equal protection or fair cross section
guarantees) a workable reality rather than a well meaning but none-
theless illusory promise. Specifically, elimination of the peremptory
challenge could produce this reality.
I Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a
federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.").
4 1 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 155b
(19th ed. 1832 & photo reprint 1979).
5 Imlay, FederalJy Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
247, 270 (1973).
6 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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I
THE BASICS OF JURY SELECTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
The selection of the petit jury, the final group chosen to hear a
case, begins with the compilation of a "master wheel" of potential
jurors in the community using the list of registered voters or the list
of actual voters.7 In recognition of minority underrepresentation
on such lists, the Jury Systems Improvement Act of 19788 provides
that, where necessary to facilitate a fair community cross section,
communities should supplement these lists with lists from other
sources. 9 From the resulting master list, the court "calls" a group of
people for a particular period of time to serve as the "venire." After
some are excused for claimed inconveniences,' 0 the final stage of
jury selection occurs: challenges.I
The attorneys trying the case may challenge prospective jurors
during voir dire, 12 an often lengthy period of pretrial questioning in
the presence of the judge that seeks to establish the jurors' ability to
impartially try the case before them. Attorneys may make two types
of challenges during this questioning period: "for cause" and per-
emptory. A "for cause" challenge requires judicial approval' 3 and
may only be made for reasons provided by statute.' 4 A peremptory
challenge, on the other hand, is "arbitrary and capricious"' 15 and
may be made for any reason. Statutes determine the number of per-
emptory challenges each side may make.' 6
7 J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 85-109 (1977).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1982).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1982).
10 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 111-37.
'' Id. at 139-75.
12 Literally, "to say the truth." WEBSTER'S TIIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2562 (1981). Also, "to see what is said." J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 140.
13 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 145.
14 Id. at 143. The grounds for such a challenge are generally the same. For exam-
ple, California law provides:
Particular causes of challenge are of two kinds:
First-For such bias as, when the existence of the facts is ascertained, in
judgment of law disqualifies the juror; and which is known in this Code as
implied bias.
Second-For the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in
reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which will prevent him
from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substan-
tial rights of either party, which is known in this Code as actual bias.
CAL.. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1985); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (West 1985);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE (West Supp. 1987).
15 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353, cited in Swain v. Alabama. 380 U.S. 202.
219 (1965).
16 In the federal court system, FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) applies. Otherwise,
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In Batson v. Kentucky 17 the Supreme Court sought to limit the
use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors' 8 (who act on behalf of
the state) when they challenge a potential juror "solely on account
of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will
be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black de-
fendant."' 9 Batson marks a significant departure from the virtually
illusory constitutional protection previously afforded blacks in the
challenge phase of jury selection. 20
The procedure for the exercise of peremptory challenges is often left
to the discretion of the trial court, although it is occasionally prescribed
by statute. The prevailing state practice has been described as follows:
Twelve veniremen are called and examined, after which the
prosecutor exercises such challenges for cause as may appear and
then exercises such peremptories as he then desires to use. Any-
one excused is immediately replaced in the box, so the prosecutor
will tender 12 jurors to the defendant, who likewise exercises chal-
lenges for cause and whatever peremptories he then desires to use.
Again those excused are immediately replaced, and when he is sat-
isfied the defendant tenders the jury to the prosecutor. This proce-
dure continues until both parties have exhausted their challenges
or indicate their satisfaction with the jury.
An alternative procedure is known as a "struck jury":
The size of the panel at [the beginning of the striking proce-
dure] is the sum of the number ofjurors to hear the case plus the
number of peremptories to be allowed all parties. The parties then
proceed to exercise their peremptories, ususally alternately or in
some similar way which will result in all parties exhausting their
challenges at approximately the same time.
Note, Limiting the Perenmptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J.
1715, 1718 n.18 (1977) (brackets in original) (quoting ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 77, 77-78 (approved draft
1968)).
17 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
18 Id. at 1719. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Court conclusively
established that a prosecutor was a state actor. The Batson Court specifically declined to
say whether there is a constitutional dimension to a defense attorney's improper use of
the peremptory challenge. 106 S. Ct. at 1718 n.12. However, it has been suggested that
by virtue of the state granting the peremptory challenge option to the defense attorney
in the first place, his or her subsequent use should be construed as "state action" and
thus subject to appropriate constitutional scrutiny. Note, A Case Study of the Peremiptory
Challenge: 4 Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662, 665
(1974).
19 106 S. Ct. at 1719.
20 The Batson analysis contains several constitutional aspects. As Justice Marshall
concluded in his plurality opinion in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), a defendant is
denied due process of the law when indicted or tried by a grand or petit jury illegally
composed. He emphasized:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of
human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as
we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented.
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II
THE ROAD TO BATSON V. KENTUCKY
A. Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge Before Batson
The fourteenth amendment, adopted in 1868, made blacks
born and naturalized in the United States "citizens .. .of the state
wherein they reside" 21 and required that the states neither abridge
their "privileges and immunities" nor deprive them "of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." 22 The amendment's most
comprehensive protection provided that no person can be denied
"the equal protection of the laws." 23  Twelve years later the
Supreme Court began to use this protection to police the jury selec-
tion system. In Strauder v. West Virginia24 the Court held that a state
statute limiting jury service to white males violated the fourteenth
amendment by excluding blacks. 25 In the following fifty-five years,
however, this nondiscrimination directive was rarely enforced. 26 In
1935 the Court in Norris v. Alabama 27 found that the defendant had
presented a prima facie case of state discrimination despite the con-
trary "factual" determinations made by the state courts. Testimony
showed that no black had ever sat on a grand or petit jury and that
potential juror lists included racial designations.28 A simple state-
ment by the jury commissioners that they did not consider race did
Id. at 503-04. And, as stated in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879), a state's
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes, on account of race, of a role as jurors in the
administration ofjustice violates the equal protection clause.
The Balson decision was based on equal protection grounds, 106 S. Ct. at 1718,
while leading state cases have reached similar results using the sixth amendment "fair
cross section of the community" standards. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
285, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 908 (1978) (California constitution's guar-
antee of jury of representative cross section held to be independent grounds to police
discriminatory use of peremptory challenge beyond Swain's limited guidelines in build-
ing prima facie case); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 478, 387 N.E.2d 499,
511 (1979) (same action based on similar guarantee of Massachusetts constitution);
State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (citing
Wheeler approvingly and indicating willingness to relax prima facie guidelines for case of
peremptory challenge discrimination to be built by the facts of present case, contra
Swai); State v. Gilmore, 103 NJ. 508, 530, 511 A.2d 1150, 1167 (1986) (adopting
Wheeler analysis to protect New Jersey constitutional guarantee of fair cross section of
community juries, contra Swain); see also State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984)
(using the Florida constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
25 Not until 1975 in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), did the Court include
women in the sweep of constitutional prohibitions against overt discrimination in jury
selection.
26 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 52.
27 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
28 Id. at 594.
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not satisfactorily rebut this prima facie case.29
After Norris, jury discrimination cases focused on the require-
ments of a prima facie case. This inquiry rested on population
figures and factors that presented the opportunity to discriminate.
The ambiguous determinations that followed 30 called for more ex-
planation. In 1965 the Court answered this call with Swain v.
Alabama.3 t
In Swain v. State32 the Alabama Supreme Court had affirmed the
conviction of Robert Swain, a black man, for the rape of a white girl
even though the prosecutor had peremptorily struck the six remain-
ing black veniremen 33 and "no Negro ha[d] actually served on a
petit jury [for 15 years]" in Talladega County, Alabama.3 4 The all-
white jury had sentenced Swain to death. 35
The Supreme Court's Swain decision focused primarily on the
rights of potential black jurors, finding that their inclusion in the
venire satisfied almost all constitutional concerns. Once the chal-
lenge stage of jury selection began, however, blacks were, like the
"white, Protestant and Catholic, . . . subject to being challenged
without cause." 36 In sweeping deference to the "peremptory chal-
lenge system as we know it," 3 7 the Court declared:
The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecu-
tor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial
jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not over-
come and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by
allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed
from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes.38
The Court's statement supported the prosecutor's "right" to pe-
remptorily challenge a black venireman solely due to his race, thus
defending the discriminatory conclusion that a black caniot impar-
tially try the case of a black defendant.
The Court did, however, indicate that consistent and systematic
strikes of black veniremen raised "a different issue"; 311 such a pat-
29 Id. at 598.
30 See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), and Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S.
278 (1909), where on identical facts in the same county a challenge of prejudice in grand
jury selection resulted in opposite results. For further examples and discussion, seeJ.
VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 53-62.
31 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
32 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368 (1963), afd, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
:33 380 U.S. at 205. The other two black veniremen were excused for cause. Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 203.
36 Id. at 221.
37 Id. at 222.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
31) Id. at 223.
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tern could rise to the level of a prima facie case of a prosecutor de-
nying blacks the right to serve on a jury. The burden placed on a
defendant to raise such a prima facie case, however, was staggering:
[W]hen the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or
the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who
have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners
and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that
no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment
claim takes on added significance. In these circumstances .. .it
would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are
being perverted. If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Ne-
gro on any jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the
prosecutor may well be overcome. 40
Despite the uncontested fact that no black had served on a petit
jury for fifteen years, 4' the Court held that no prima facie case of
discrimination existed because the record did not establish that "the
prosecutor alone" was responsible. 42
In the twenty-one years after Swain, only two claims succeeded
in establishing a prima facie showing of discrimination. 43
B. Batson and the New Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
In Batson v. Kentucky 44 the Supreme Court overruled the Swain
standard for assessing a prima facie case of discrimination in petit
jury selection. The Court declared that "the Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be unable to consider impartially the State's case against
40 Id. at 223-24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
41 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
42 380 U.S. at 224. The Court noted that other prosecutors may have contributed
to these statistics (although this prosecutor had served since 1953), id. at 225, or that
defense counsel may have participated as well, id. at 227.
43 State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (prosecutor's peremptory challenges
of all blacks in venire, along with evidence of similar systematic exclusions in past cases
held to create prima facie case of discrimination); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162
(La. 1979) (prosecutor's peremptory exclusion of first 12 black veniremen along with an
admission that it was his general practice to exclude blacks, without individual question-
ing, when defendant was black, held to constitute prima facie discrimination). Query
whether the Louisiana Supreme Court used an anti-Sw'ain gloss in these determinations.
Some other courts have tried various options to get around Swain, including the use
of the government supervisory power, United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D.
Conn. 1976), the FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 option of granting a new trial "in the interest of
justice," United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974), and the use of
state constitutions as providing protection to its citizens over and above Swain's. See
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 561, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1977); People v. Wheeler,
22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
44 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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a black defendant.
'
"
4 5
In Batson, an all-white jury convicted a black defendant of sec-
ond-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods.4 61 The prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks on the ve-
nire.4 7 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction re-
lying on Swain.48 The United States Supreme Court reversed.
49
Stating that a person's race "simply 'is unrelated to his fitness
as a juror,' -50 the Court insisted that the Constitution requires a
searching review of state procedures to stop "all forms of pur-
poseful racial discrimination in selection ofjurors."' With this em-
phasis, the Court recognized that "Swain has placed on defendants a
crippling burden of proof, [and] prosecutors' peremptory chal-
lenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."5 -2
The Court established a new standard for assessing whether a
defendant has established a prima facie case of discriminatory selec-
tion from the venire. "[A] defendant may establish a prima facie
case . . . solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.' 5 3
Under Batson the defense must prove three elements to over-
come the presumption of legally permissible jury selection by the
prosecutor. First, the defendant must show that he or she is a mem-
ber of a cognizable racial group5 4 and that the prosecutor exercised
peremptory challenges to remove at least one member of the de-
fendant's race from the venire. 55 Next, the Court allows the defend-
ant to "rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a
45 Id. at 1719.
46 Id. at 1715.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1715-16.
49 Id. at 1716.
50 Id. at 1718 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
51 Id. at 1718; see also Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1906) (while evidence
of no blacks on the grand or petit jury alone does not constitute proof of discrimination,
a defendant has the right not to have persons of his or her race excluded solely because
of their race); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880) (purposeful exclusion of
blacks from grand and petit juries violates black defendant's constitutional rights).
52 106 S. Ct. at 1720-21 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 1722-23 (emphasis added). In a later case, Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct.
708 (1987), the Court held that Ba/son applied to all cases pending or not yet final.
54 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Some courts have held that though the Ba/son protection
applies to racial discrimination it does not apply to whites. See, e.g., Pope v. State. 256
Ga. 189, 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986); State v. Wagster, 489 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
cerl. denied. 493 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1986).
55 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Batson analysis presupposes a properly drawn venire. Litiga-
tion based on "master wheel" compilation techniques which either on their face or in
their application result in an unrepresentative cross section of the community is beyond
the scope of this note.
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jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of
a mind to discriminate.' "56
The final element of the prima facie case requires that the de-
fendant show that the above facts "and any other relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [the peremptory
challenge] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account
of their race." 57 Relevant circumstances include a discernable "pat-
tern" of peremptory strikes and the prosecutor's questions and
statements during voir dire questioning.58 The trial judge then de-
termines whether it is reasonable to infer discrimination. The Court
insisted that "trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will
be able to decide [whether the defendant has established] a prima
facie case of discrimination." 59
After a defendant establishes a prima facie case,60 the burden
shifts to the state to "come forward with a neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors."'6 Although the prosecutor's explana-
tions "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause," 62 a mere statement by the prosecutor that he "challenged
jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive
judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of
their shared race" is insufficient. 63 Nor can the prosecutor simply
deny "a discriminatory motive" or affirm "good faith in individual
selections. '64 Rather, the prosecutor must give "clear and reason-
ably specific" explanations for the challenges in question.65
The Court formulated no specific remedies for situations where
the prosecutor fails to rebut the defendant's prima facie discrimina-
tion case. The Court's opinion suggests two options: a court could
empanel a new venire and begin the jury selection process again, or
it could allow selection of the petit jurors to resume with the ille-
56 106 S. Ct. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
57 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Although the Balson court did not address the issue directly, other courts have
interpreted Batson to require the defendant's initial objection to be "timely." Williams v.
State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (proper time for objection was after
peremptory strikes but before jury was sworn in); see also United States v. Erwin, 793
F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1986) (objection dismissed as untimely where defendant waited week
after peremptory challenges had been made although jury had not been sworn in yet);
Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing timeliness in habeas rorpus
context); Bowden v. Kemp, 793 F.2d 273 (11 h Cir. 1986) (same).
61 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
62 Id.
63 Id
64 Id.
65 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
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gally challenged jurors reinstated on the venire. 66
III
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BATSON REMEDY
Although the Batson decision makes it easier for a defendant to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination and thus to shift the
burden of rebuttal to the prosecutor, significant barriers to truly ef-
fective enforcement remain. Although a defendant may now estab-
lish a prima facie case based only on the facts in the trial at hand, the
contours of what constitutes a prima facie showing of discrimination
remain elusive, imprecise, and difficult to review on appeal. More
significantly, the ease with which a prosecutor can rebut a defend-
ant's prima facie case constitutes an important barrier to nondis-
crimination in the jury selection system.
A. The Inadequacies Inherent in Building a Prima Facie Case
The precise contours of a prima facie showing remain poorly
defined. Prima facie showings are relatively fact-specific and subjec-
tive. One court allowed the defendant to establish a prima facie
case by showing that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges
to remove every member of the defendant's race from the venire. 67
But other courts have held that total exclusion, without more, does
not establish a prima facie showing. 68
Some defendants have offered statistical analyses to aid courts
in their determinations. One such approach involves "rate[s] of ex-
clusion" 69 in which the number of peremptory challenges available
to the allegedly offending party is divided by the number of mem-
bers of the venire not challenged for cause. This is the expected
rate of exclusion. If the actual rate of exclusion, the number of mi-
nority members challenged peremptorily by the allegedly offending
party divided by the number of minority group members on the ve-
nire not struck for cause, is significantly larger than the expected
rate, a presumption of discrimination exists. 70 However, this analy-
66 Id. at 1724 n.24.
67 See, e.g., People v. Clay, 153 Cal. App. 3d 433, 455, 200 Cal. Rptr. 269, 279
(1984) (prima facie case of discrimination established solely by prosecutor's exclusion of
all black veniremen from petit jury).
68 See, e.g., People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536-37, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892,
897 (1982) (defendant held not to have established a prima facie case of discrimination
by only stating that the prosecutor had peremptorily challenged the only blacks on ve-
nire); Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1983) (dicta) (same) (citing
United States v. Greene, 626 F.2d 75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980)), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1046 (1984).
69 Note, supra note 16, at 1739 (1977).
70 For example, if there are 48 jurors on the venire not challenged for cause and
the allegedly offending party has six peremptory challenges, the expected rate of exclusion
1034 [Vol. 72:1026
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sis still leaves unanswered the question of how great a discrepancy is
"significant." 7 1
Discrepancies in expected and actual rates of exclusion alone
are not always conclusive, even if they are clearly significant. Other
factors can contribute to a prima facie showing. The Batson court
spoke of strike "patterns" 72 and noted that desultory voir dire ques-
tioning of an excused minority member of the venire suggested a
discriminatory purpose. 73 People v. Simpson,74 a post-Batson case de-
cided in New York, suggested that a prosecutor's challenges for
cause could provide helpful insight into peremptory challenge mo-
tives 75 and might create a "reasonable inference of discrimination."
In another case, the prosecutor volunteered reasons for minority ex-
clusions and thus, in the court's view, sacrificed his "presumption of
correctness."
7 6
Other complicating factors can negate a prima facie showing.
For example, a defendant's own complicity in the "skewed member-
ship" of the petit jury can estop a claim of discrimination. 77 In State
v. Mfoore,78 another post-Batson case, the first petit jury member se-
lected was black, and the defense later peremptorily struck a black
venireman that the prosecutor had accepted. 79 This defeated the
defendant's prima facie claim.80 However, these "complicating"
factors do not address the motivation for a prosecutor's peremptory
challenges of other minority veniremen, and thus courts should not
allow the factors to negate a prima facie case.
More significantly, with their primary emphasis on numbers,
prima facie guidelines necessitate that discriminatory challenges be
would be one in eight (6/48) or 12.5%. If that party challenged four of five blacks on
the venire peremptorily, the actual rate of exclusoin would be 80% (4/5). Id. at 1739
n.108.
71 One professor suggested the following standard: "To suggest that discrimina-
tion is at work... the discrepancy must be great enough to eliminate chance as a reason-
able explanation." Kuhn,Juny Disoimination: The ,\.'t Phase, 41 S. CAL.. L. REV. 235, 252
(1968). Kuhn referred to Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), where the Court
said: "[It taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no mem-
her of this class among the over six thousand jurors called [to the venirel in the past 25
years." Id. at 482.
72 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
7:1 Id. at 1723.
74 121 A.D.2d 881, 504 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1986).
75 Id. at 883 n.1, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 117 n.1.
76 Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1983), cerd. denied, 464 U.S.
1046 (1984); cf. United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1984) (unlike
I 'ealhersby, district court decision impermissibly requested explanation of challenge
before prima facie case had been established).
77 Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 379 Mass. 640, 400 N.E.2d 821, 828 (1980).
78 490 So. 2d 556 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
7) Id. at 558-59.
80 Id.
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"flagrant.""' Therefore, asJustice Marshall pointed out, "Prosecu-
tors are left free to discriminate against blacks injury selection pro-
vided that they hold that discrimination to an 'acceptable' level."8 2
The Court calls upon trial judges to use their own experience
and judgment to decide whether a defendant has made a prima facie
showing.8 3 The morass of contributing and negating factors that a
judge may consider results in a more judge-specific than case-spe-
cific determination. Consequently, appellate courts are highly defer-
ential to the trial judge's initial ruling on the existence of a prima
facie case.8 4
B. The Ease of Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
Once a defendant successfully establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination in jury selection against a prosecutor, "the burden
shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors. " 85 The Batson Court called for "clear and
reasonably specific" explanations, 86 which "need not rise to the
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." 87 The Court, at-
tempting to limit the broad range of rebuttal possibilities, declared
that neither an avowal of good faith nor a statement of belief that a
black potential juror could not be impartial because of his race is a
valid explanation. 88 Nevertheless, a prosecutor can so easily rebut a
prima facie case that the Court's equal protection guarantees are
illusory.
Some prosecutors do put forward obvious "sham excuses"
which can even be detected on appeal. In People v. Hall, 89 for exam-
ple, the prosecutor in a rape case justified his peremptory challenge
of a black venireman on the ground that 'Mr. Robinson never
81 106 S. Ct. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1723.
84 Id. at 1724 n.21; see also People v. Clay, 153 Cal. App. 3d 433, 456, 200 Cal. Rptr.
269, 279 (1984) ("[Wie must 'rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distin-
guish bona fide reasons.., from sham excuses ....' ") (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (1978)); Commonwealth v.
DiMatteo, 12 Mass. App. 547, 551-53, 427 N.E.2d 754, 758 (1981) (any support in trial
record precludes substituting trial judge's judgment with appellate judgment), appeal
denied, 385 Mass. 1101, 440 N.E.2d 1173 (1982). But see People v. Fuller, 136 Cal. App.
3d 403, 423, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283, 296 (1982) (finding that no independent grounds for
peremptory challenges of black veniremen were present thus overruling lower court and
holding that prima facie case was established).
85 Balson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
86 Id. at 1724 n.20.
87 Id. at 1723.
88 Id.
89 35 Cal.3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983).
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cracked a smile'" and was therefore insensitive. 90 Although the
trial court accepted this explanation, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia reversed, with the ChiefJustice ridiculing: 'Get the word out to
black venire persons: they should all be jolly if they wish to sit in
judgment of rape cases.' "91 In People v. Fuller92 the prosecutor un-
successfully rebutted the prima facie case by accusing the defense
attorney of discrimination in his own challenges. 93 Again, the trial
court was satisfied but the case was reversed on appeal.
As Justice Marshall opined in his Batson concurrence, "Any
prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking aju-
ror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess those rea-
sons."' 94 One court recognized the ease with which a prosecutor
could rebut a prima facie showing, but seemingly accepted that pos-
sibility stating, "The evidence [offered in rebuttal] may range from
the obviously serious to the apparently trivial, from the virtually cer-
tain to the highly speculative. For example, a prosecutor may fear
bias on the part of one juror ... because his clothes or hair length
suggest an unconventional lifestyle." 95
Cases applying a Batson-like analysis, primarily in California and
Massachusetts, illustrate the disturbing ease with which a prosecutor
can defeat a prima facie discrimination case.96 Acceptable explana-
tions have included "evasive answers,"'9 7 uncommunicativeness, 98
and that "the juror was wearing a gold earring and the prosecutor
did not 'like his looks.' "99 In another case, the prosecutor conspic-
uously shifted the supposed grounds for his peremptory challenges
90 Id. at 165, 672 P.2d at 856, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (quoting trial record).
91 Id. at 173, 672 P.2d at 861, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (Bird, CJ., concurring) (quoting
People v. Hall, 189 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (Poch&,J., dissenting).
92 136 Cal. App.3d 417, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1982).
93 Id. at 417-18, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 291-93.
94 106 S. Ct. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring).
95 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 275, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
902 (1978).
96 One of the first cases applying the Ba/son standards, State v. Newman, 491 So. 2d
174 (La. Ct. App. 1986), illustrates the illusory nature of a prima facie discrimination
case once the burden shifts to a prosecutor. There, the prosecutor successfully
responded:
Each one of the peremptory challenges that I exercised, I do have written
down on my sheet of paper a particular reason as to, not as to race, but as
to answers to questions that I posed to the potential jurors that made me
make my selection, and there was no systematic basis by which I excluded
anyone and it was strictly on the questions to the answers [sic] that I
posed to them and I exercised the challenges that are given to me under
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Id. at 177. This "adequate" explanation seems little better than an avowal of good faith.
97 Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1046 (1984).
98 King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 498-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
99 Commonwealth v. Lattimore, 396 Mass. 446, 448, 486 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1985).
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of blacks.' 00 He started with "youth," but because he had not chal-
lenged youthful whites he supplemented his answer by stating that
the challenge was based on the black juror's "demeanor" and a "lot
of intangible factors" and "vibrations."' 0 ' The court found that the
challenges were not racially motivated.' 02
Appellate review of these cases is extremely limited. As stated
in King v. County of Nassau, 103 "[Any explanation which a Court
deems adequate as a matter of law should be treated as having a
sufficient basis in fact unless it appears plainly that the explanation is
factually incorrect or that it is totally lacking in factual basis."' 0 4
A subconscious barrier to equal protection also exists in these
cases. Prosecutors are under "enormous pressure to lie regarding
their motives. ' 105 In addition, "it is . . . possible that an attorney
may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives
are legal." '10 Justice Marshall, in Batson, commented:
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead
him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is "sul-
len," or "distant," a characterization that would not have come to
his mind if a white juror had acted identically. Ajudge's own con-
scious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an ex-
planation as well supported.' 0 7
Judicial investigation of a prosecutor's explanation can extend
beyond the judge's own gut instinct. A judge can also determine
whether a prosecutor's given reasons would have made unexcused
white veniremen objectionable. Again, however, a prosecutor can
easily find a distinguishing feature (such as a gold earring) or some
subjective personality evaluation (such as a uncommunicativeness)
that will easily withstand review by the trial judge.
The ambiguities of prima facie showings of discrimination and
the ease with which a prosecutor can rebut those showings signifi-
cantly hinder the enforcement of nondiscriminatory peremptory
challenges. These barriers will exist as long as the courts allow es-
sentially arbitrary challenges that "need not rise to the level justify-
ing exercise of a challenge for cause."10 8 The only effective way to
protect against discriminatory jury challenges is to eliminate per-
emptory challenges completely.
100 United States v. Campbell, 766 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1985).
101 Id. at 27 (quoting government prosecutor's statements).
102 Id. at 27-28.
103 581 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
104 Id. at 499 (emphasis in original).
105 Id. at 502.
lo Id.
107 Balson, 106 S. Ct. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 1723.
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ABOLISHING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: THE ONLY
EFFECTIVE REMEDY
In the years preceding Batson, jury discrimination claims em-
phasized establishment of a prima facie case. Indeed, Ba/son is a
"historic step"")!' in that regard. But in light of the Court's renewed
commitment to eliminate discrimination injury selection and in rec-
ognition of the inherent impediments to policing the peremptory
challenge, the time has come to remedy jury selection discrimina-
tion completely by abolishing the peremptory challenge altogether.
As the Batson Court recognized, "there can be no dispute....
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that per-
mits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' ,"10
This section explains how the jury selection system can sustain the
loss of the peremptory challenge. First, it traces the history of the
challenge and discusses the Supreme Court's view of the constitu-
tional implications of eliminating the challenge. Next, it discusses
the pervasiveness of jury selection discrimination in light of the
Supreme Court's mandate for effective remedial action. Finally, it
explores the functions of the peremptory challenge and argues that
a slightly liberalized voir dire and challenge for cause can fill most of
the gaps left by this proposal, while avoiding the discriminatory pit-
falls of current law.
A. Historical Origins of the Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge is traceable to abusive practices by
the Crown. III The early English jury consisted of a group of wit-
nesses to the charged crime and served as an inquisitorial device. 1 2
The Crown sought and selected jurors who possessed the most rele-
vant knowledge, and thus the number of "peremptory challenges"
was unlimited.' 'I In 1305, however, because the Crown's right was
perceived as 'mischievous to the subject, tending to infinite delays
and danger,'"'' 4 An Ordinance for Inquests' ' removed the
1t)9 Id. at 1726.
I Io Id. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559. 562 (1953)).
III C omment, Swain v. Alabama: .1 Colilulional Bteprinlfor Ike Ppeltaliou flhe .ll-
While fty, 52 N.%. L. REv. 1157. 1170-71 (1966) (smnmarizing T. l'.tlKCE'Err A CONCISE
HISTORY oF Trni COMMON Iw 110-28. 433 (5th ed. 1956)).
I 12 See T. lI'.tICKNETr.- su/na note Il I at 109-113. The original English jury II crimI-
nal trials more closely resembled today's grand jury. Royal oflicers could compel "'in-
habitants ... to inform against evil doers to disclose mysterious crimes, and to tell of
their suspicions." Id. at 112. In essence, these " Juries" merely accused individuals but
did not determine guilt or innocence. Id. at 113. Tits, the Crown's officers "dis-
missed" from juries those with no knowledge of crimes.
1 13 Comment, sltra note I 1, at 117 1.
114 Id. (quoting I E. CoKE, supa note 4, § 1561)).
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Crown's unlimited right to challenge, although still permitting chal-
lenges for cause. 116
The defendant, on the other hand, possessed the statutory
right ' 7 to what is recognizable as the modern peremptory chal-
lenge. The defendant's right to challenge was unquestioned and, in
the words of the influential eighteenth century legal commentator
Sir William Blackstone, was "a provision full of that tenderness and
humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are justly
famous." 18
As early as 1682, the courts allowed the Crown a "substitute for
the . . . peremptory challenge, the so-called right to 'stand
aside.' "19 The Crown could ask an unlimited number of potential
jurors to stand aside without explanation, so long as twelve jurors
were chosen before exhaustion of the venire panel.' 20 In essence,
this right was based on an assumption that cause existed whenever
the Crown challenged a juror. On the rare occasions when twelve
jurors were not chosen, the Crown was required to show cause for
those challenged.' 21
An Ordinance of Inquests 22 marked the English shift from the
inquisitorial jury to that of an impartial trier of facts.' 23 Even the
"stand aside" rights of the Crown were, theoretically, only a delayed
challenge for cause. Juries served the same function in the United
States. "[T]he right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave [the de-
fendant] an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge."'124 ProfessorJon Van Dyke set out the initial American sys-
tem of challenges:
[T]he 1305 statute providing for peremptory challenges by de-
115 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305), reprinted in 1 D. PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE 309-10
(1762).
1 16 The peremptory challenge has never been restored to the prosecution in Eng-
land. Comment, supra note 111, at 1171.
117 Id.
118 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *353.
119 Comment, supra note 11, at 117 1.
120 Id.
121 Because judicial discretion governed the number of potential jurors called, ap-
parently the venire panel was rarely exhausted before a petit jury was empaneled. For
example, in 1699 a prosecutor, asked to "show cause" for the persons he requested to
"stand aside," replied: "I do not know in all my practice of this nature, that it was ever
put upon the king to shew cause, and I believe some of the king's counsel would say they
have not known it done." Cowper's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 1106, 1108 (1699), quoted in
Merriam, Right of Prosecution to Stand Jurors Aside, 14 CENT. LJ. 402, 403 (1882).
122 33 Edw. 1 Stat. 4 (1305), reprinted in I D. PICKERING, supra note 115, at 309-10
(1762).
123 Comment, supra note 111, at 1172.
124 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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fendants was accepted as a part of the received common law. The
prosecution's practice of "standing jurors aside" was, however,
more controversial, and substantial popular protest was raised
against it. The two most populous states, New York and Virginia
both denied the prosecution any peremptory challenges for most of the nine-
teenth century. Some states continued to authorize "standing
aside," and some gradually began allowing the prosecution to
challenge peremptorily, but ... limited the number severely. 12 5
Although the prosecution gradually came to exercise the per-
emptory challenge by statutory right, historical origins of the chal-
lenge demonstrate that the prosecutor's interest in peremptory
challenges does not outweigh the defendant's interest. Further-
more, early in the twentieth century the Supreme Court declared
that the challenge had no Constitutional dimensions: "There is
nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the
Congress to grant peremptory challenges .... ,,126
B. Pervasiveness of Jury Selection Discrimination
"Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors
has become both common and flagrant"' 27 declared Justice Mar-
shall in Batson. This Note does not explore the truth of this state-
ment in depth: the proof would be both voluminous and sadly
intuitive anyway. Justice Marshall gathered corroborative statistics
introduced as evidence in several cases and noted open admissions
made by prosecutors who routinely strike blackjurors. 128 As quoted
in a Texas Observer newspaper article in 1973, an instruction book
used by one Texas county prosecutor's office explicitly advised
prosecutors to eliminate '''any member of a minority group' '129
during selection. In that county the chance of a qualified black sit-
ting on ajury was one-in-ten, compared to one-in-two for a white.130
That such purposeful exclusion is unconstitutional has been
firmly established.' 3 ' Statutory rights to peremptory challenges,
however, are facially neutral and thus not directly unconstitu-
125 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 148-49 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
126 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). Obviously, this applies equally
to defendants.
127 106 S. Ct. at 1726 (Marshall, J., concurring). For a comprehensive analysis of
discrimination injury selection, see Johnson, Black Inmocence and the ll'kiteJury, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1611 (1985).
128 106 S. Ct. at 1726-27.
129 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 152 (quoting Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, at 9,
col. 2).
130 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1727 (citing Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, at 1, col.
1).
131 See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (holding unconstitutional Dela-
ware's exclusion from juries of persons of African descent). See generally Johnson, supra
note 127.
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tional.13 2 However, in light of the Court's renewed commitment to
ending the invidious discrimination inherent in peremptory chal-
lenges and in recognition that the Batson remedy is not comprehen-
sive, the Court must eliminate the peremptory challenge altogether.
In Swain, the Court showed great deference to the "nature and
operation of the.., peremptory challenge system as we know it."l13
But, as Justice Goldberg noted in his dissent, "Were it necessary to
make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a
jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitu-
tion compels a choice of the former."' 34 Therefore, "the system,
not the Constitution, must be changed."' 35
C. Implementation Guidelines
Given the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and the
sacrifices compelled by the Constitution, courts must rethink the
purposes ofjury selection, keeping in mind that "[t]he right to chal-
lenge is the right to reject, not to select ajuror."' 365 The challenge for
cause, administered under a liberalized voir dire structure, would be
sufficient for identifying and rejecting jurors incapable of impartially
trying a case. To the extent that some biases remain undetected
through vigorous questioning, the "harm" that may result is inher-
ent in the jury system itself-an integral part of the essence of hav-
ing citizens unschooled in law serving as triers of fact. Moreover, a
peremptory challenge is only an educated guess as to the partiality
of a juror. Some hunches may be correct, and should be vigorously
pursued in voir dire questioning to justify a challenge for cause.
Others are based on prejudices, and should be disallowed.
Two simple changes would facilitate effective and nondiscrimi-
natory jury selection. First, judges should make wider use of the
'catch-all" challenge for cause included in most statutes. ' 7 These
"catch-all" provisions usually refer to a "state of mind" that will
prevent ajuror from acting with entire impartiality and without prej-
132 See Johnson, supra note 127, at 1684.
133 Swaij, 380 U.S. at 222.
1:34 Id. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)). Justice Marshall also cited this passage fion .Marburi in Balson.
106 S. Ct. at 1728. Justice Marshall wrote separately to advocate "eliminating perelnp-
tory challenges entirely in criminal cases." Id.
1:i5 Kuhn, supra notc 71. at 295.
13 6 Haves %. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887) (emphasis added).
137 See. e.gq. IND. CODF. ANN. § 35-37-1-5 (Burns 1986) ("That he is biased or
prejudiced lbr or against the defendant."); I.A. CODF CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1765 (West
1986) ("When the juror has formed an opinion in the case or is not otherwise impar-
tial."); M.%ss. ANN. L.w's Ch. 234. § 28 (Law. Co-op 1986) (if a juror is "sensible of any
bias or prejudice" another juror shall be called instead).
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udice to the substantial rights of either party.'"" Second, judges
should always allow the attorneys to ask the voir dire questions. 3 9
This gives each side the best opportunity to uncover biased jurors.
Additionally, judges should permit more liberal lines of questioning
aimed at eliciting such bias. These suggestions are far from radical,
especially in light of the need for some gap filling upon abolition of
peremptory challenges, and they will facilitate justified rejections,
not selections, of potential jurors.
1. Expanding the Challenge For Cause
Defendants' attorneys often defend the peremptory challenge
on the grounds that it makes a defendant "feel good" about the
jury. ' 40 However, if parties seek to reject biased jurors, rather than
select ajury, attorneys' and judges' best efforts to discover unsuita-
ble states of mind will create this "good feeling." To the extent that
some "good feelings" about a juror depend upon conscious or un-
conscious biases, the Constitution compels a sacrifice.
In some situations courts should conclusively presume unsuita-
bility (beyond current presumptions such as relation to the parties
and attorneys, for example). For instance, judges should automati-
cally excuse known Ku Klux Klan members' 4' and members of the
Black Panthers in cases where clear racial or religious conflicts arise
between the parties or where the biases of these groups may affect
the juror's evaluation of witnesses' testimony. Simply put, a policy
of automatic exclusion for cause should apply to members of groups
that have made their biases publicly and "doctrinally" known,
thereby creating a strong presumption of partiality in appropriate
cases.
Parties challenging jurors for cause should do so outside of the
presence of thejury. Proponents of the peremptory challenge argue
that unsuccessful attempts at securing a challenge for cause biases
those jurors against the attorney who tried to excuse them. The
peremptory challenge, they argue, allows the attorney to avoid that
problem.' 42 Challenge motions made away from the jury would also
138 See supr note 14.
1'59 Since 1944, federal judges have exercised exclusive control over voir dire under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 164. "A 1970 study of 219 federal
judges showed that 53.4 percent questioned jurors by themselves, 31.1 percent allowed
attorneys to ask some supplemental questions. 13.2 percent allowed attorneys to ask all
the questions, and 2.3 percent authorized the questioning of jurors by a clerk or thc
attorneys outside the judge's presence." Id. at 164, 174 n. 108 (citing WORKS OF rilE
COMMITIIEE ON TlHE OPERvrION OF TIE 'JURY SYsrEMI OF TIIEJUI)ICI-I. CONFERENCE OF TilE
UNITED STrVS. TlE.TRY SYSTEM IN 'l FEDERAL. COURTS 174 (1973)).
140 J. VAN DIKE, supra note 7, at 168.
141 See State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256 (1939).
142 See stpra note 15.
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avoid those problems.
2. Liberalizing Voir Dire
In contrast to the current trend toward judge-run question-
ing, ' 43 attorneys should conduct the voir dire questioning of the ve-
nire panel. Although this practice will undoubtedly lengthen the
voir dire procedure, fairness and the greater purpose of ending the
discrimination created by peremptory challenges outweigh the re-
sulting costs of delay. Although attorneys have been criticized for
abusing voir dire privileges by asking inappropriate questions meant
to indoctrinate or propagandize potential jurors, 14 4 the judge can
guard against such abuses without taking complete control of the
questioning. This leaves attorneys in a better position to lay the
groundwork for challenges and to uncover biases they feel are rele-
vant in the case at hand. 45
Judges should also allow attorneys greater freedom in pursuing
lines of questioning. In Aldridge v. United States146 the Supreme
Court held that a black man accused of murdering a white man
could pursue lines of voir dire questioning designed to establish
whether potential jurors were racially prejudiced. 147 Subsequently,
however, the Court in Ristaino v. Ross 148 limited this right to the spe-
cific facts of Ham v. South Carolina 149 where the black defendant pur-
sued questions of racial bias due to his well known civil rights
activities, claiming as a defense that he was framed on the narcotics
charges because of his activism.' 50 Thus, the question of whether
the need to ask potential jurors about racial prejudices rises "to con-
stitutional dimensions" currently requires a fact-based inquiry.' 5 '
Ristaino should be overruled to facilitate more extensive and ef-
fective questioning of the venire. After all, few jurors would re-
spond affirmatively to the standard question put by thejudge-"Do
you have any biases which would prevent you from serving as an
impartial juror?"-if their bias were based on race.' 52 Numerous
143 See generally Tapp, Debate Continues Over ll'ho Should Conduct I'oir Dire, Chi. Daily L.
Bull., June 3, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
144 People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 825, 506 P.2d 193, 199-200, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369,
375 (1973).
145 SeeJ. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 164.
146 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
147 See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (reaffirming the principle of
.Aldridge, 283 U.S. 308).
148 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
149 409 U.S. 524 (1972).
15o Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597-98.
151 Id. at 598.
152 Under these conditions jurors will more likely give the socially acceptable answer
rather than admit racial biases. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 168.
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examples demonstrate that biases are often elicited only after a
lengthy period of questioning.153 Thus judges should allow attor-
neys greater leeway when questioning potential jurors for bias.
A final justification of the peremptory challenge rests on the
utility of excusing ajuror offended by vigorous questioning aimed at
153 One example:
[MR. GARRY]: Now, it's a fact, is it not, that you already had an opinion
before you came here about this case?
[PROSPECTIVE JUROR]: Well, to a certain extent, yes.Q. All right. Now, is your opinion that you had about this case before
you got here such that it would take the tremendous amount of evidence
to overcome that opinion?
A. No. It wouldn't. If-what evidence will show, that I will evaluate and
see who is right and who is wrong.
Q. It's not a question so much as to who is right and who is wrong. As
you sit there, Mr. Strauss, in your opinion, right now while you are sitting
there this minute, is Huey P. Newton guilty or not guilty?
A. Well, I don't know for sure whether he shot the officer or not, but the
officer is dead.
Q. And by that same standard, just because the officer is dead, you are
going to say that Huey Newton did it; is that right?
A. Well, that's got to be proven.
Q. Well, my question is: As you sit there right now, do you believe that
Huey Newton shot and killed, stabbed, whatever it was, Officer Frey?
A. I don't know whether he shot him or not. That I can't say.
THE COURT: Mr. Strauss, you see, under our law there is a presump-
tion of innocence to start with. When you start the case the defendant is
presumed to be innocent, and it is up to the People, the prosecution, to
prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Do
you understand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: So, now, not having heard any evidence, you must start
with a presumption of innocence. Do you know what I mean by presump-
tion? You must say, 'As far as I know the man is innocent.' Do you un-
derstand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: 'And it is up to the prosecution to prove to me that he is
guilty.' Do you understand that?
THE JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: So, therefore, as it stands right now, do you believe he is
guilty before you hear any evidence?...
THE JUROR: No.
MR. GARRY: Well, do you really believe that as Huey Newton sits here
right now next to me, that he is innocent of any wrongdoing of any kind?
A. No. That I don't believe.
MR. GARRY: Mr. Strauss, again I ask you that same question which you
have answered three times to me now .... As Huey Newton sits here next
to me now, in your opinion is he absolutely innocent?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't believe it, do you?
A. No.
THE COURT: Challenge is allowed.
TInE NATIONAL L\WYERS GUILD, MINIMIZING RACISM IN JURY TRIALS: THE VOIR DIRE
CONDUCTED BY CHARLES R. GARRY IN People of California v. Huey F. Newton 90-94 (A. Gin-
ger 1969).
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eliciting grounds for a challenge for cause.'15 4 Although this justifi-
cation has much merit, a judge can ameliorate the impact of the
questioning by emphasizing that the purpose is not to personally
offend but rather to secure a fair trial for the parties before the
court. In addition, attorneys will just have to make sincere efforts to
remain unoffensive in the course of their questioning. All of this is
in keeping with the original purpose of the challenges in voir dire:
"to reject, not to select."' 55
CONCLUSION
The abolition of the peremptory challenge is not a new idea.
Rather, the Supreme Court's renewed dedication to eliminating dis-
crimination in the jury selection system in Batson v. Kentucky should
be seen as a call for a comprehensive remedy, one that effectively
overcomes the post-Swain years of remedial inactivity. Batson takes
an important half step toward equal protection, but its specific rem-
edy, facilitation of a prima facie case, is obviated by the easily carried
burden that shifts to the state. Only elimination of the peremptory
challenge, coupled with expanded challenges for cause and voir dire
efficacy, can comprehensively remedy discrimination in jury selec-
tion.
Jonathan B. intz
154 4 W. BLACKSTONE, s.wpra not 15. at *353.
155 Haves v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68. 71 (1877).
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